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For the past twenty five years non-military influence (economic 
sanctions and soft power) acquired growing prominence in foreign 
policy of the great powers. The US, the EU, China and Japan employ 
non-military tools in responding to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear 
crises that threaten their security. Non-military instruments these are 
means of great powers by which they seek to influence the behavior of 
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target states, to demonstrate leadership, to resolve international conflict 
and to express common values. The growing centrality of non-military 
instruments is partially a reaction to the limits of military power exposed 
during difficult and protracted operations inside the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Moreover, military 
interventions in the postbipolar international relations are difficult to 
justify. Without any challenger on the horizon, it is highly unclear what 
constitutes a threat to national security that needs to be addressed with 
military force together with its inherent sacrifices in life and 
expenditure. Above all, because economic rather than military strength 
is increasingly seen by states as the prime determinant of international 
power, non-military tools may begin to assume an even more prominent 
role. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the debate on the nature of economic 
sanctions has been in existence for five decades, the investigation on 
their efficacy has not yielded satisfactory results. Scientists in the West 
have long argued that there is no automatic link between the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions in inflicting economic pain and in 
compelling  policy  changes  in  the  target.  D. Drezner,  B.  de  Neuilly, 
C. Portela, emphasize that sanctions regimes with a remarkable 
economic impact have failed to induce changes in the conduct of target 
non-democratic states. D. Drezner, conversely, stresses that mere threat 
of economic sanctions has sometimes succeeded in bringing about the 
desired policy change [Drezner, 1999]. Ukrainian scientists S. Galaka 
[Galaka, 2003], V. Pahil [Pahil, 2000], and S. Romanenko [Romanenko, 
2001] are strong supporters of this wide-spread concept. Works by 
contemporary researchers on issues related to the economic sanctions 
and financial statecraft, among whom are Margaret Doxy [Doxy, 1971], 
Richard N. Haass [Haass, 1998], Zachary Selden [Selden, 1999], 
Brendan Taylor [Taylor, 2010], play an important role in understanding 
the nature of economic coercion in foreign policy making, but they say a 
very little on how to estimate the economic sanctions effectiveness. 
Thus, the determinants for the success and failure of economic sanctions 
have not been ascertained. The inherent difficulty of the task has been 
further compounded by a transformation of the instrument itself in the 
contemporary system of international relations. Soft power has become 
part of popular political discourse since it was coined by Harvard‘s 
Joseph Nye in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of 
American Power, strengthened by his Soft Power: The Means to  
Success  in  World Politics,  and  further  elaborated  in  The Powers  To 
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Lead (Nye, 2004), in Soft Power and US foreign policy by M.Cox, (Cox, 
2010). 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the nature of non-military 
instruments (economic sanctions, soft power and communication 
strategies) of foreign policy within the international relations theory, 
because these tools are becoming increasingly central to shaping 
strategic outcomes in the XXI century. 
At first, we will try to conceptualize the definition of the economic 
sanctions in the international relations theory. There is no generally 
accepted definition of economic sanctions. The term ―economic 
sanctions‖ is one of the more confused and confusing to have entered  
the lexicon and discourse of international politics. 
For instance, Daniel Drezner, a towering figure who made path 
breaking and enduring contributions to political analysis of the 
economic sanctions, the author of the ―sanctions paradox‖, defines 
economic sanctions as ―the threat or act by a nation-state or coalition of 
nation-states, called the sender, to disrupt economic exchange with 
another nation-state, called the target, unless the targeted country 
acquiesces  to  an  articulated  political  demand‖  [Drezner,  1999:  2]. 
R.J. Ellings ascertains economic sanctions as the governmental policies 
that cut or curtail economic relations in order to coerce the target 
country(ies) into behaving in accordance with the sanctioner‘s(s‘) 
objectives [Ellings, 1991: 16]. G. Lopez and D. Cortright qualify 
economic sanctions as the ―coercive foreign policy action of a nation(s) 
in which it intentionally suspends customary economic relations such as 
trade and/or financial exchanges in order to prompt the targeted nation 
to  change  its  policy  or  behavior  [Lopez  and  Cortright,  1998:  15]. 
N. Crawford determines economic sanctions as ―the denial of customary 
interactions (strategic, economic, or social); they are intended to 
promote social, political, or economic change in a target state‖ 
[Crawford, 1999: 5]. According to J. Blanchard, N. Ripsman and 
Shambaugh, economic sanctions strategy is the particular form of the 
coercive foreign policy in which a state disrupts its normal economic 
relations with another state in order to achieve one of the following 
objectives: (1) to induce the targeted state to change its behavior; (2) to 
generate popular pressure on the government that causes it to change its 
policies; or (3) to provoke a coup or revolt that leads to the emergence  
of a new government that will act in accordance with the sanctioning 
state‘s wishes [Blanchard, Ripsman 2000: 219; Shambaugh 1999: 4]. 
Rennack evaluates economic sanctions like ―coercive measures imposed 
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by one country, or coalition of countries, against another country, its 
government or individual entities therein, to bring about a change in 
behavior or policies [Rennack 2000]. American theorist in economic 
sanctions policy M. O‘Sullivan characterizes economic sanctions as the 
deliberate withdrawal of normal trade or financial relations for foreign 
policy purposes [O‟Sullivan, 2003: 12]. 
Theorists in international politics distinguish economic sanctions 
from economic wars. For instance, R. Pape illustrates the difference 
between these two categories. According to the scientist, economic 
sanctions ―seek to lower the economic welfare of a target state by 
reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government to 
change its political behaviour‖ [Pape, 1997: 93-94]. By contrast, an 
economic war takes place ―when a state threatens to inflict economic 
harm… in order to persuade the target state to agree to terms of trade 
more favorable to the coercing state‖ [Pape, 1997: 94]. 
Economic sanctions operate in a similar way to military warfare. 
Both share the same end, the ―political disintegration of the enemy so 
that he gives up the pursuit of his goals. The method used is value 
deprivation‖ [Galtung, 1967: 386]. The theory foresees a roughly 
proportionate relation between both phenomena: the more intense the 
value-deprivation, the more widespread the political disintegration in the 
target state. J. Galtung explains: ―The idea is that there is a limit to how 
much value deprivation the system can stand, and that once this limit is 
reached (resulting in a split in leadership or between leadership and 
people), then political disintegration will proceed very rapidly and will 
lead to surrender or willingness to negotiate‖ [Galtung, 1967: 388]. 
Thus, two central definitional elements can be discerned in the 
concept of economic sanctions: the coercive measures need to be 
economic in nature and its aim needs to be political. 
It is necessary to note that the basic methodological approaches to 
the study of the nature of economic sanctions as the tool of foreign 
policy formed over decades within the paradigm of realism, liberalism 
and constructivism. 
Realism is concerned with the efficient use of economic sanctions  
for the pursuit of national interests. Realists conceptualize (economic) 
sanctions not as punishment on illegal or immoral acts but as a state‘s 
foreign-policy instrument used for the pursuit of national egoistic 
interests. In classical definition of the realism, sanctions entail ―the 
deliberate government-inspired withdrawal of trade or financial relations 
to obtain foreign policy goals‖ [Hufbauer, 1985: 2]. James Barber 
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defined economic sanctions simply as ―economic measures directed to 
political objectives‖ [Barber, 1979: 367]. 
Realist scholars of economic sanctions assume that: 1) a primary 
sanctioner in world politics is not a collective international actor as 
international organization, but state; 2) economic sanctions are not 
measure of law enforcement but a foreign policy instrument; 3) the key 
role of economic sanctions on the world stage is not to reduce the 
number of deviant acts but is to coerce the target state to fulfill a 
sanctioning country wishes; 4) economic sanctions are realized in the 
anarchical international system which consists of states as the primary 
actors. Thus, realists explain the nature of economic sanctions through 
the logic of power, interests, and rationality. 
On the other hand, liberalists borrowed their ideas of economic 
sanctions from municipal laws. Overall, the nature of economic 
sanctions within liberalism can be characterized by the following 
provisions: 1) economic sanctions should be applied by the international 
organization in order to maintain international peace and security. For 
instance, Quincy Wright claimed that the use of sanctions must be 
authorized by an international organization [Wright, 1965: 206]. 
Liberalists argue that the United Nations Security Council applies 
economic sanctions to deal with four different categories of threats to 
international peace and security: 1) armed conflict between states; 2) 
armed conflict within states; 3) international norm-breaking states (the 
so-called ―rouges‖); and 4) international terrorism; 2) economic 
sanctions are applied in the international system which is not anarchical, 
but should be understood as community that is composed of state and 
none-state actors who share common interests; 3) economic sanctions 
should be governed not by power politics but by the rule of law; 4) the 
use of the mechanism of economic coercion should be regulated not by 
the balance of power but by collective security. 
How does collective economic sanctions system work? M.S. Daoudi 
and M.S. Dajani summarize liberal arguments articulated in the interwar 
period concisely: 
1. The balance of power system is dead. It has failed to prevent wars 
and maintain the peace. What is the alternative? 
2. By the establishment of an international organization. How will 
this system enforce the law without military conflicts? 
3. By the establishment of international economic sanctions. This 
weapon is powerful, effective, relatively cheap, bloodless, and 
moreover, easy to use to bring any aggressor to knees. 
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4. Economic sanctions have a moral power. They enjoy universal 
public support. 
5. States are innately rational. With the economic threat hanging 
over their heads, they will not find it worthwhile to deliberately wage 
wars aggression. 
6. Neutrality is a precarious concept which the community of  
nations needs to abandon [Daoudi and Dajani, 1983: 18-19]. 
At last, constructivism as the methodological approach in the 
international relations theory holds the view that: economic sanctions 
are not objective phenomenon, but the social construction is shaped by 
shared ideas as well as material forces; economic sanctions are based on 
the identities and interests of political actors are shaped primarily by 
shared ideas [Wendt, 1999: 1]. In other words, economic sanctions are 
the means by which social construction of reality has been created. What 
is the main goal of economic sanctions in international policy? 
According to constructivists, the sanction strategy is aimed to ensure 
common values in the international society but not in the international 
system which is based on the power balance whether normative rules of 
the international institutions. 
Theorists in international politics are primarily interested in 
answering two questions: 1) do economic sanctions work?; and 2) under 
what conditions do economic sanctions work? 
The determinants of the efficiency of economic sanctions in 
international relations studies could be characterized by the following 
provisions: 
– economic sanctions are to be designed to maximize pressure on the 
culpable actors, to inflict pain and suffering upon the leaders whose 
policy the sender tries to influence. Sanctions should be appropriately 
targeted to minimize humanitarian impact on population in the objective 
state; 
– the evidence from the cases suggests that the presence of political 
opposition in the target which oriented on sanctioning  state  makes 
economic sanctions more fruitful. The political groups that lose from 
economic sanctions will find themselves in a financially  diminished 
position, which may reduce their political influence. The ―fifth column‖ 
effect is probable response of groups in the political elite of the target to 
economic sanctions and that rely on imports or export-oriented producers; 
– scientists in international relations stress that economic sanctions are  
of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals like regime change and 
democratization. The security, political or other costs of complying with the 
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sender demands may simply be higher than any pain that can be imposed 
with economic sanctions. That is why economic sanctions succeed if they 
are designed to achieve moderate political goals in the target; 
– multilateral cooperation among the sanctioning states is a 
necessary and/ or sufficient condition for generating a successful 
outcome [Drezner, 2000]. 
– theorists in international politics assume that economically 
punishing sanctions are less likely to succeed against a nondemocratic 
target than they are against a democratic target. The reason for this 
conditional relationship is twofold. First, sanctions increase a leader‘s 
ability to extract rents. Greater rents increase a nondemocratic leader‘s 
ability to hold onto power, but greater rents do not increase a democratic 
leader‘s ability to retain office. Second, the pressure to yield to sanctions 
depends critically on who is bearing the brunt of the costs in the targeted 
state. To succeed, sanctions need to target the regime‘s winning 
coalition, the size and composition of which depend on a state‘s political 
institutions [Portela, 2010]. 
In XXI century the processes of globalization and the information 
revolution led to essential transformation of the international system, 
which is now composed of three different spheres: a military sphere, 
where the USA has unipolar control but there are several states with a 
growing military potential as China and Russia and which are ready to 
become rivalries to the American presence around the world; an 
economic sphere, where there is a multipolarity shared by the USA, the 
European Union and Japan; and a third transnational sphere, where a 
diversity of state and non-state agents coexist [Nye Jr 2002: 39]. The 
characteristics of the emerging threats also have their origins in the 
processes of globalization and the information revolution: their main 
agents are non-state entities that exist and act in the transnational sphere. 
If hard power resources can be effective in the military and economic 
spheres, only soft power can work at the transnational level and in 
reality of proxy war. For Ukraine which is evolved in a war conflict with 
Russia the soft power instruments can become effective tools to secure 
national interests of Kyiv. So in terms of aggravation of Ukrainian- 
Russian confrontation in its bilateral and multilateral dimensions, the 
issue of the content and consequences of the soft power mechanism, the 
soft power mechanism‘s role in the relations among countries require an 
in-depth study. 
Let now look at theoretical formulation of soft power. The concept  
of soft power that is well known throughout the world is only the 
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definition used by professor Joseph Nye; nevertheless, it is not the only 
one and its various definitions are not free of contradictions among 
them. 
Taking into considerations mentioned above, we are addressing the 
conceptualization of soft power given in Nye‘s main works. 
We will begin with a brief discussion about the nature of power, 
admittedly one of the most disputed concepts in political science and 
international relations. Nye opts for a succinct definition: ‗power is the 
ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes  one 
wants‘ [Nye Jr., 1990: 25–9, 2002: 4–5, 2004: 1–5]. This conciseness 
allows him to focus on other aspects of power in international relations, 
as he moves on to articulate the distinction between hard and soft power. 
The concepts are twofold: ‗The distinction between hard and soft power 
is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility 
of the resource‘ [Nye Jr., 1990: 267, 2002: 176, 2004: 7]. This 
distinction between power behaviors and power resources is the crucial 
element in Nye‘s concept of soft power. 
Thus, Nye defines soft power as the ability to make others want what 
you want. In this sense, soft power is the opposite of hard power, the 
ability to make others do what you want. As traditionally understood in 
international relations theories, hard power presupposes an active and 
direct engagement of the actors involved, expressed by incentives or 
threats, and is usually related to military force or economic resources. 
Soft power, which Nye also calls co-optive or indirect power, rests on 
the attraction a set of ideas exerts, or on the capacity to set political 
agendas that shape the preferences of others. Therefore, soft power is 
related to intangible resources like culture, ideologies and institutions 
[Nye Jr., 1990: 31–35]. 
According to Nye, power behaviors are ways of exercising power. 
Different types of behavior form a spectrum ranging from command 
power to co-optive power. Command power is the ability to change  
what others do, while co-optive power is the ability to shape what others 
want. Therefore, command power is manifested through acts of coercion 
and persuasion, and co-optive power can be seen in the attraction 
exerted by a given agent and his capacity to define political agendas. 
The second distinction between hard and soft power deals with the 
tangibility of power resources. However, the scientist does not apply any 
specific terminology at this point. Referring to tangibility, Nye uses the 
terms hard power resources and soft power resources. Hard power 
resources are well known: population, territory, natural resources, the 
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size of the economy, armed forces, technological development, among 
others. These are tangible resources. In opposition, soft power resources 
are characteristically intangible resources: culture, ideology, values and 
institutions are the most common examples. 
It is also worth noting that in all works of Nye there is no discussion 
on the meaning of tangibility. The question of what would qualify a 
resource as tangible or intangible is not a simple one. Nye classifies 
economic resources as tangibles, but an argument could be made that 
most of the time they do not have a physical existence. A financial 
agreement lending money to a developing country could save its 
economy from a major crisis, but it is not easy to see the tangibility of 
this power resource – especially in credibility crisis, as economists well 
know. On the opposite side of the spectrum, Nye classifies institutions 
as intangible resources. It is comprehensible that he might be referring  
to institutional ideas and what they represent, but some institutions have 
physical existence, very important and present ones, running projects 
and programs all over the world. The fact is that Nye leaves the reader 
with no criteria to address the tangibility of power resources. 
In any case, the distinction between hard and soft power is given by 
taking together the nature of the agent‘s behavior and the tangibility of 
the resources. However, a serious problem arises directly from this 
articulation. It has to do with the relation between power behaviors and 
power resources: ―… soft power resources tend to be associated with co- 
optive power behavior, whereas hard power resources are usually 
associated with command behavior. But the relationship is imperfect‖ 
[Nye Jr 1990: 267, 2002: 176, 2004: 7]. The logical consequence of the 
terminology used by Nye is that command power is related to hard 
power resources, and co-optive power to soft power resources. But these 
relations do not always hold true: it is possible for command power 
behavior to utilize intangible soft power resources, in the same sense 
that co-optive power behavior can make use of tangible hard power 
resources. Actually, it is even possible that command power creates soft 
power resources, or that co-optive power creates hard power resources. 
Communication as an element of soft power has a significant impact 
on foreign policy, both in the policy-making process and at a higher 
level associated with the nexus of foreign policy and international 
relations. Communication involves the transmission or conveying of 
information through a system of symbols, signs, or behavior. 
Communication connects individuals and groups; (re)constructs the 
context; and defines, describes, and delineates foreign policy options. 
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The current trends are the synthesis in many areas, with a focus on the 
psychological processes associated with who communicates, how, to 
whom, and with what effect in the realm of foreign policy; and with the 
structural characteristics of communication or discourse. The major 
areas of publications on foreign policy and communication include: (a) 
the making of foreign policy and the role of mass media in this process; 
(b) how foreign policy is understood as a communicated message by 
allies and adversaries in international relations; and (c) constructivism, 
poststructuralism, and discourse analysis. Within the scope of foreign 
policy and media falls work associated with the CNN effect, framing, 
and public opinion. Works within international relations have focused  
on how foreign policy signals international intent, including threat and 
willingness to cooperate [Gilboa, 2002]. 
Conclusions. Summing up the above mentioned we admit that  
economic sanctions as the foreign policy tool that prescribes the disruption 
of economic relations in order to coerce the target state to change 
disapproved policy. Theorists assume that the main goal of economic 
sanctions is to change target country‘s behavior as desired by a 
sanctioning state. Thus, scientists suppose that compellence is the main 
aim which pursues sanctioning country. Other goals of economic 
sanctions are specific deterrence, weakening, international and domestic 
symbolism. 
Scholars are unanimous in the opinion that economic harm leads to 
political disintegration brought about by an unwillingness of the 
population in the target country to suffer economically because of 
internationally unpopular policy. 
Іt іs determined that soft power is the use of attraction and persuasion 
rather than the use of coercion or force in foreign policy. It arises from 
the attractiveness of a country‘s culture, political ideals and policies, 
whereas hard power develops out of a country‘s military or economic 
might. Thus, the soft power of a country rests primarily on three 
resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its 
political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its 
foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral 
authority). On the other hand, the set of liberal ideas promoted by the 
USA and shared by other Western states, such as democracy and free 
markets, made soft power resources easier to implement. With other 
states sharing the same principles and values, the costs of maintaining 
the order through economic incentives or military threats were reduced. 
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